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STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN ILLINOIS
CRIMINAL CASES: THE NEED FOR MAJOR

REFORM
Timothy P. O'Neill*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 19, 1992, the United States Supreme Court issued one
of the most eagerly awaited opinions of the 1991 Term. The Court
had granted certiorari in Wright v. West' to determine what should
be the proper standard of review when a federal court decides a
mixed question of law and fact in a habeas corpus petition from a
state criminal judgment. Although the Court decided the case without
reaching that issue 2, it was the latest in a growing list of recent cases
in which the Supreme Court has faced a standard of review issue.'
The proper standard of review-that is, the proper degree of
deference an appellate court owes to any aspect of the lower court's
decision-is a threshold issue in an appellate decision. It should be
the starting point for the resolution of each separate issue in an
appeal. Yet appellate courts at both the state and federal level have
often given insufficient attention to standards of review. Some opinions omit any discussion of a standard of review; others mention
the subject only in the most perfunctory manner.
The Supreme Court's recent interest in standards of review is
emblematic of a renewed interest in the subject. This is exhibited
both in federal court decisions and in academic writing generally.
Unfortunately, this ferment has not affected how Illinois appellate
courts decide criminal appeals. Despite what is occurring in the federal
courts, there has been almost no new debate or re-examination of
the standards of review in criminal cases in Illinois.
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; A.B. Harvard University; J.D.
University of Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance
of Melissa Lader, Stephanie Wepner, Vita Conforti, and Cheryl Lukas.
1. 112 S.Ct. 672 (1991).
2. The Court held that regardless of whether the sufficiency of the evidence was reviewed
deferentially or de novo, the trial record contained more than enough evidence to support
respondent's conviction. Therefore, it did not have to decide which i.s the proper standard.
Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482 (1992).
3. See infra note 172.
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This Article contends that such a change is long overdue. Part
II provides a general overview of the area of standards of review.
Part III discusses Illinois' use of standards of review in a variety of
issues that regularly arise in criminal appeals. It will establish how
often Illinois' position is at odds with the position of many federal
courts. It will also pinpoint issues that currently spawn serious debate
among federal circuits, and how Illinois has refused to even acknowledge these conflicts. Part IV will suggest two ways under current
Illinois law in which parties raising certain issues in a criminal appeal
may obtain a more favorable standard of review. Finally, in Part V
this Article will recommend several ways Illinois courts-and Illinois
advocates-can improve the way standards of review are used in this
state's criminal appellate decisions.
II.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW

As a general rule, a standard of review is the "degree of deference
given by the reviewing court to the decision under review. ' 4 It is the
"power of the lens" through which an appellate court examines the
decision of a particular issue in a case.5 It should be impossible to
raise an issue in an appellate court without first establishing the
appropriate standard of review. That is because, in a colloquial sense,
the standard of review tells the appellate court "how wrong" the
trial court must be before its decision may be overturned. For some
issues, a finding that the trial court was "slightly wrong" will justify
a reversal; for other issues, the trial court must be upheld unless it
was "very wrong."
Theoretically, an appellant could win or lose a case based solely
on the selection of the standard of review. Yet, according to at least
one commentator, until recently standards of review were given short
shrift by appellate judges and lawyers. Robert L. Byer contends that
standards of review appeared "frequently ...

in the nature of boil-

erplate expressions which had the appearance of being used not to
confine the boundaries of appellate review prior to deciding particular
issues in the case, but rather as mechanistic incantations inserted to
justify a predetermined result." '6 The suspicion that standards of
4. Martha S. Davis and Steven A. Childress, Standards of Review in Criminal Appeals:
Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461, 465 (1986).
5. Robert L. Byer, Judge Aldisert's Contribution to Appellate Methodology: Emphasizing
and Defining Standards of Review, 48 U. OF PrTT. L.R. xvi, xvi (1987).
6. Id.

HeinOnline -- 17 S. Ill. U. L. J. 52 1992-1993

19921

Reform of Illinois Criminal Standards of Review

review actually mask a result-orientated jurisprudence has led some
commentators to suggest that reviewing courts simply do as they
review have no more
please, and that the. "rules governing judicial
7
grape."
seedless
a
than
core
the
at
substance
Yet, there are signs that the legal community is beginning to take
the area of standards of review more seriously. There is a growing
literature in law journals.' Additionally, as noted above, the United
States Supreme Court has decided several major standard of review
cases during the last decade. 9 And, at least six federal circuits have
adopted circuit rules specifically requiring all briefs to include the
proper standard of review for each issue.' 0
Yet, perhaps the most encouraging sign has been the recent
publication of a major two volume treatise on standards of review
co-authored by Martha S. Davis and Steven Alan Childress." The2
treatise is the culmination of years of work by these two scholars,
and is a welcome addition to the literature in both the civil and
criminal areas.
Childress and Davis show that standards of review in criminal
cases involve far more than arcane discussion differentiating questions
of fact from questions of law; underlying these distinctions -lies the
7. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 771, 780 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Thomas S. Hall, McClesky v. Zant: A Stricter Standard of Review for Abuse
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Involving Successive Federal Petitions, 25 CREI HTON L. REV.
233 (1991); Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ.
L. REV. 231 (1991); Julie G. Hudson, The Exclusivity of the Appraisal Remedy Under the
New North Carolina Business Corporation Act: Deciding the Standard of Review for CashOut Mergers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 501 (1991); Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion
Issues: The Federal Circuit's Standard of Review, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 1221 (1991); Mark
Ostrich, ERISA Litigation: What To Do About Standards of Review?, 38 LA. B.J. 327 (1991);
Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases After Firestone
Tie and Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution on Deja Vu?, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 31 (1990);
Christopher A. Considine, Rule 11: Conflicting Appellate Standards of Review and a Proposed
Uniform Approach, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 727 (1990).
9. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, Ill S.Ct. 1217 (1991); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarz
Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
10. See 3d Cir. R. 21(h); 4th Cir. R. 28(c); 7th Cir. 28(k); 9th Cir. R. 13(b)(2)(A); 10th
Cir. R. 28.2(c); 1th Cir. R. 28-2(h)(iii).
11.

MARTHA S. DAVIS AND STEVEN A. CmLDRESS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW (John Wiley &

Sons 1986).
12. See, e.g., Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.
DAKOTA L. REV. 468 (1988); Martha S. Davis & Stever Alan Childress, Standards of Review
in Criminal Appeals: Fifth Circuit Illustration and Analysis, 60 TUL. L. REV. 461 (1986);
Steven Alan Childress, "Clearly Erroneous": Judicial Review Over District Courts in the
Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REV. 93 (1986); Steven Alan Childress, Standards of
Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals, 9 NOVA L. REv. 257 (1985).
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crucial question of how power is allocated among the decisionmakers
in the criminal system:
What level of deference will the appellate court give to the judge,
the jury, the prosecutor, and the defendant, and to the other
participants in the process? Where are the boundaries that mark the
extent of the power of the participants; or, perhaps more legalistically,
in what area do those boundaries move about? Once these boundaries,
or boundary areas, are defined, appeal becomes more predictable,
and even the choice whether to appeal at all can be made more
rationally. '3
A. The Basic Distinctions: The Different Standards of Review for
Questions of Law and Questions of Fact
For purposes of standards of review, decisions by judges are
traditionally divided into two categories-questions of law and ques4
tions of fact.'
As to a question of law, an appellate court is free to substitute
its own judgment in place of that of the trial court. That is, the
appellate court owes absolutely no deference to the conclusion of the
trial court; its only task is to formulate what it believes to be the
correct answer. This is called "de novo" review. 5
Several reasons have been advanced concerning why this is an
6
appropriate power for appellate courts reviewing questions of law.'
First, it can be argued that deciding questions of law is the raison
d'etre of appellate courts. Unlike the trial court, the appellate court
is not burdened with the significant time commitments needed for
hearing evidence and deciding facts. Second, generally three appellate
judges are asked to decide legal issues in an appellate court case' 7 as
opposed to only one judge in a trial setting. The use of "three heads
instead of one" hopefully minimizes the opportunity for error.
On the other hand, the power of appellate courts is much more
circumscribed when reviewing questions of fact. With factual issues,
appellate courts can reject the findings of the trial court only if the

13. Davis and Childress, supra note 4, at 464.
14. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557 (1988).
15. DAvis AND CHILDRESS, supra note 11, at § 15.2.
16. These reasons were articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 824
(1984).
17. The obvious exceptions include review by a state supreme court and en banc review
by a federal court of appeals.
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findings are "clearly erroneous."' 8 The United States Supreme Court
has held that "[a] finding is clearly erroneous when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."' 19 This is a far more deferential standard than de novo
review. Davis and Childress note, "[oin questions of fact, the reviewing court usually asks whether the decision is reasonable; on questions
2 Or, to put it another
of law, it asks whether the decision is correct.'"'
way, in reviewing a question of fact the issue is "not whether the
trial level result is the better or best one but only whether it is a

legally permissible one.'

'21

Again, reasons have been advanced why this more restricted
review is proper for questions of fact. 22 First, it is presumed that the
trial judge is in a better position to sort out fact from fiction. The
trial judge can both hear live evidence and evaluate the credibility of
live witnesses-functions an appellate court cannot perform .23Second,
the main function of an appellate court is to fashion a harmonious
body of law to be used as precedent for future cases. Time spent in
fact-finding would distract the court from this primary legal function.
B.

What is a Question of Law? What is a Question of Fact?

What, then, is the difference between a "question of fact" and
a "question of law"? A simple dichotomy can be suggested. One
commentator has suggested that "facts" are those findings that
"generally respond to inquiries about who, when, what, and where."' '
Thus, whether a defendant drove her car through a red light is
considered a question of fact. 25 Statements of "law," on the other

18. See Fed. R.Civ. P. 52(a). Although this is a rule of civil procedure, the same standard
is used for factual findings in criminal cases on issues other than guilt. Hernandez v. New
York, Ill S.Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991).
19. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285 n.14 (1982) (citing United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
20. DAvis & CHILDRESS, supra note 11, at § 7.5, p. 16 (emphasis in original).
21. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unkfied View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 999 (1986).
22. See supra note 16.
23. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) ("[trial judge) is usually in a superior position to appraise and
weigh the evidence"), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
24. Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985).
25. This example was drawn from Louis, supra note 21.
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hand, are "fact-free general principles that are applicable to all, or
26
at least to many, disputes and not simply to the one sub judice."
Thus, the particular duty a defendant owes to another while driving
27
her vehicle on a public street is a question of law.
Yet, this crude example belies the difficulties inherent in drawing
distinctions between fact and law. As recently as June of 1990, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "[tihe [Supreme] Court has long noted the
difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues.'' 2 In
1982, the Supreme Court remarked on the "vexing nature" of the
fact/law distinction 29 and concluded that "[w]e yet know of ... [no]
rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from
a legal conclusion." 30 One commentator has noted that "['law' and
'fact' are] equally expansible and collapsible terms... . It is readily
acknowledged that the term 'law' is indefinable. No less difficult to
bound is the orbit of that companionate phantom 'fact'." 13 ' Another
states:
In truth, the distinction between 'questions of law' and 'questions
of fact' . . is no fixed distinction. They are not two mutually
exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subjectmatter. Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and
matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of
law.... It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to review,
they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the question
one of 'fact'; and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a
question of 'law'. 3 2
Indeed, Henry P. Monaghan has challenged the entire concept of law
and fact being a dichotomy, and instead refers to their "nodal
quality" as representing "points of rest and relative stability on a
' 33
continuum of experience.
A growing trend challenges the traditional "two-step" view that
courts first identify whether the issue is one of fact or law and then
apply the proper standard of review. Monaghan contends that often

26. Id. (citing HENRY HART AND ALBERT SACKS, The Legal Process 374 (text. ed. 1958)).
27. Id.
28. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990).
29. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (citing Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)).
30. Id.
31. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 233 n.24 (citing L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930)).
32.
STATES

J.DICKINSON,

ADMINISTRATIVE

JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY

OF LAW IN THE UNITED

55 (1927) (emphasis in original).

33. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 233.
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the procedure is reversed; that is, the standard of review is selected
based on which decisionmaker is better equipped to have a final say
on a particular issue, and only then is the issue conveniently labeled
one of "fact" or "law" to support the decision.3 4 As Monaghan
succinctly notes, the "real issue is not analytic, but allocative: what
decisionmaker should decide the issue?" 35 No less an authority than
36
the United States Supreme Court has agreed. In Miller v. Fenton,
the Court approvingly cited Monaghon's observation and added that
"[t]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination
that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial
actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question."13 7 As Judge Richard Posner has tersely stated, "'law' and 'fact'
do not in legal discourse denote pre-existing things; they express
policy-grounded legal conclusions.''38
Thus, distinguishing law from fact is a daunting enough task for
an appellate court. Yet an equally difficult chore faces an appellate
court when it reviews those decisions reached by the trial court when
it applied existing law to historical facts. An appellate court must
decide how to review these "mixed questions of law and fact."
C.

What is a "Mixed Question of Law and Fact"?

The United States Supreme Court has defined "mixed questions
of law and fact" as "[q]uestions in which the historical facts are
admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue
is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another
way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or

34. Id.at 237.
35. Id.
36. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
37. Id.at 114.
38. Weidner v. Thieret, 866 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1989). See also United States v.
Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.) ("[W]hether a confession is voluntary
But merely to observe that voluntariness is not
is not really a fact, but .a characterization ....
a fact does not answer the question whether the determination of voluntariness should be
made by the trial judge, by the jury (if there is one), or by the appellate court."), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 203 (1990); Galowski v. Murphy, 891 F.2d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 921 (1990). In an earlier case, Judge Posner wrote:
The question whether a rule of law has been violated-a question that requires
applying the rule to the facts-is normally treated as a question of fact (cite omitted)
not because it is a question Qf fact (it isn't) but as a way of expressing a decision
to leave the answer to the trial judge or jury to make, subject only to limited
appellate review.
Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1311-12 (7th Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 908 (1988).

HeinOnline -- 17 S. Ill. U. L. J. 57 1992-1993

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 17

is not violated." 3 9 The Ninth Circuit has described the decision of a
mixed question as consisting of three steps: the establishment of the
historical fact; the selection of the applicable rule of law; and the
application of the law to the facts to determine whether or not the
rule has been violated. 40 For example, in the situation alluded to
earlier, 4' whether a driver ran a red light is a question of fact, while
the duty a driver owes the public is a question of law. Yet the ultimate
determination whether running a red light constitutes negligence requires the application of law to fact and is thus a "mixed question
of law and fact."
D. What is the Standard of Review for a "Mixed Question of
Law and Fact"?
As discussed above, 42 the appropriate standards of review for
questions of fact and questions of law are "clearly erroneous" and
"de novo", respectively. What, then, is the standard of review for a
"mixed question of law and fact"?
The Supreme Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint 43 alluded to
this issue without deciding it, but noted that there was "substantial
authority in the Circuits on both sides of [the] question" of whether
a mixed question should be reviewed as a legal or factual question."
Of the circuits that use a de novo standard of review for mixed
questions, perhaps the Ninth Circuit has provided the most careful
analysis. In 1984, in United States v. McConney"4 , the en banc court
squarely confronted the issue of the proper standard of review for
mixed questions. The court examined whether the decision on a mixed
question was essentially factual-that is, whether it is founded on the
application of the "fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct,"4 or essentially legal-that is, whether
the decision concerned the "exercise [of] judgment about the values

39. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
40. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 824 (1984).
41. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
43. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
44. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19. The Court also noted its own decision
provided "support" for the proposition that mixed questions are "independently reviewable"
by an appellate court. Id. (citing'Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 39 (1937); Helvering
v. Tex-Penn Oil, 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937); Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 131 (1935).
45. 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
46. Id. at 1199 (quoting Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960)).
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that animate legal principles." ' 47 The Ninth Circuit then concluded
that, as a general rule, 41 deciding mixed questions requires legal
judgment and, therefore, a de novo appellate standard is more appropriate. Other circuits also share this view. 49
Of the circuits that use a "clearly erroneous" standard for mixed
questions, perhaps the Seventh Circuit has been most adamant about

the need for deference to the trial court on such questions.50 Other
circuits hold similarly.5

Behind this split of authority lie several serious issues about the
very nature and purpose of appellate courts. In deciding whether to

exercise de novo or deferential review, Martin Louis has observed
that an appellate court must consider "a host of interrelated factors
involving the nature, importance, novelty, and technicality of the
question, the relative abilities of the trial and appellate levels to

answer it initially or permanently, and the type of trial level decisionmaker involved." '5 2 Arguments in favor of de novo review of mixed
questions stress the ability of an appellate court to establish a "decisional environment in which uniformity could flourish." 53 Moreover,
de novo review brings to the mixed question the advantage of collegial
consideration of questions which is inherent in panel consideration of

47. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202.
48. Id. at 1203. Exceptions to the "general predominance of factors favoring de novo
review" include mixed questions in which the applicable legal standard provides for a strictly
factual test, for example, state of mind or the question of negligence. See Pullman-Standard
v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 (1982) (holding
that a retrial is barred only when conduct provoking the successful motion was "intended,"
the Court noted that lower court findings on this matter merited deferential review); Duberstein,
363 U.S. at 289.
49. See Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945, 947 (1 1th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel.
Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 174 n.12 (3rd Cir. 1976); Stafos v. Jarvis, 477 F.2d 369,
372 (10th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Salisbury, 448 F.2d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 1971).
50. Judges Posner and Easterbrook appear to have spearheaded the Seventh Circuit's
efforts in this area. See United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1992); United States
v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 418-23 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring); United States v.
Malin, 908 F.2d 163, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., and Posner, J., concurring);
Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc);
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1988); Davenport v.
DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988); Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986);
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Schuneman
v. United States, 783 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that mixed questions of law and fact
are independently reviewed by an appellate court).
51. Rogers v. Bates, 431 F.2d 16, 18 (8th Cir. 1970); Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. McCoy,
167 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 1948).
52. Louis, supra note 21, at 1026.
53. Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 940 (concurring).
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cases. The three-judge decisional process guarantees that the issue will
be studied by people with "varied legal backgrounds and a circuit54
wide vantage point." ,
Supporters of a deferential approach turn this argument around
and ask "[w]hy should three judges redo the work of one?" ' , They
criticize de novo review in such situations as "disruptive, time consuming, and potentially unconstitutional.' ' 6 They contend that the
trial judge is in as good as, if not a better, position to make such a
7
fact-specific determination.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW USED BY ILLINOIS
APPELLATE COURTS TO DECIDE CRIMINAL CASES
The various standards of review can be analogized to scalpels
used by a surgeon. Subtle differences among scalpels make one type
appropriate for certain medical procedures, yet totally inappropriate
for others. To pursue the analogy, the "scalpel" selected by an
appellate court judge should differ depending on the nature of the
problem facing the court-a question of law, a question of fact, or
a mixed question of law and fact.
A.

The Review of Illinois Suppression Decisions

If most appellate courts wield their standards of review as scalpels, then in reviewing suppression motions in criminal cases, Illinois
appellate courts use meat cleavers. Illinois courts are blind to the
distinctions among the variety of issues which are spawned by suppression motions. In Illinois, a reviewing court will not disturb a
circuit court's ruling on a motion to quash an arrest unless that
finding is manifestly erroneous.18 Nor will a reviewing court disturb
a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence unless it is

54. Id.
55. Id. at 933 (majority opinion).
56. Louis, supra note 21, at 1032.
57. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm L. REv. 1175,
1186 (1989) (criticizing United States Supreme Court's selection of Fourth Amendment cases
"in which the question seems to be of no more general interest than whether, in this particular
fact situation, pattern 3,445, the search was reasonable" and arguing that such "essentially
factual determination[s]" should be left to the lower courts).
58. People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ill.
1990); People v. Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146,
1152 (Ill.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 (1988); People v. Cabrera, 508 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ill.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987).
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manifestly erroneous.5 9 Findings by the circuit court on the question

of voluntariness of a confession are not disturbed unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence.60 A trial court's ruling
identification will not be disturbed unless
on a motion to suppress
6
manifestly erroneous. '
Moreover, Illinois courts refuse to distinguish between the diverse
issues arising out of suppression hearings. The appellate courts totally

defer to the trial court on factual determinations and witness credibility judgments.62 Yet, it offers the same deference to a trial court's

determination of whether sufficient exigent circumstances exist to
justify a warrantless search; 63 whether the "knock and announce"

requirement should be excused in a particular case; 64 whether a

warrantless search exceeded the permissible scope of a search incident
to an arrest; 65 whether a defendant waived the presence of counsel at
a lineup;66 and even to whether a police officer from one municipality
had jurisdiction to make an arrest in a different, unincorporated
portion of the same county. 67 All of these decisions are reviewed
under a "manifest error" standard.
Compare this to the standard used in several federal circuits
which differentiate between legal and factual issues in suppression
motion decisions. These courts review factual findings under a clearly6
erroneous standard and legal conclusions under a de novo standard. 1

59. People v. Galvin, 535 N.E.2d 837, 841 (I11. 1989); Redd, 553 N.E.2d at 332 (citing
People v. Neal, 486 N.E.2d 898, 899 (II1. 1985); People v. Clay, 304 N.E.2d 280, 282 (Ill.
1973).
60. Redd, 553 N.E.2d at 333. See also People v. King, 488 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 872 (1986); People v. Davis, 452 N.E.2d 525, 534 (I11. 1983); People v.
Fauntleroy, 586 N.E.2d 292, 307 (111.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991).
61. People v. Garcia, 454 N.E.2d 274, 279 (Ill. 1983).
62. Redd, 553 N.E.2d at 322. See People v. Conner, 401 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1979);
People v. Henderson, 210 N.E.2d 483, 485 (Ill. 1965).
63. People v. Holloway, 426 N.E.2d 871, 876 (II1. 1981); People v. Chambers, 558 N.E.2d
274, 281 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
64. Conner, 401 N.E.2d at 516.
65. People v. Williams, 311 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ill.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
66. People v. Dailey, 282 N.E.2d 129, 130 (Iil. 1972).
67. People v. DeBlieck, 537 N.E.2d 388, 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
68. Federal Courts that appear to follow the view include the Second Circuit (United States
v. Osorio, 949 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1991)); Fifth Circuit (United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d
903, 906 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Colin, 928 F.2d 676, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1991)); Ninth
Circuit (United States v. Booker, 952 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ramos,
923 F.2d 1346, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991)); Tenth Circuit (United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534,
1536-37 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1190 (1992); United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 238 (1991)); and Eleventh Circuit (United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d
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Making such a distinction does not solve all appellate problems. It
does not, for example, determine whether a particular problem facing
the court is factual or legal. 69 What this distinction does recognize,
however, is that trial courts are in a better position to make some,
but not all, decisions relating to a suppression motion. The appellate
court will thus defer to the trial court's decisions on certain issues
even if the appellate court might have decided a particular issue
differently.70 These are designated as "factual findings" and will be
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. On other issues,
however, the appellate court will wish to ensure "consistent
application"' from one case to another. This will favor designating
an issue as legal and subject to de novo review in order to allow an
appellate court to establish such consistency.
This article's criticism of Illinois' approach to standards of review
in the suppression context is not that Illinois is necessarily wrong on
any particular issue, for example, whether "seizure" is a factual or

legal issue. 7 Rather, this article faults Illinois courts for refusing to
understand that within the area of the suppression motion lies a
myriad of issues which require careful and separate consideration
concerning the proper standard of review. Illinois courts, by refusing
1226, 1232 (1lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 885 (1992); United States v. Ramos, 933
F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1269 (1992); United States v. Garcia,
890 F.2d 355, 358 (11th Cir. 1989)). But see United States v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 299 (10th
Cir. 1991) ("clearly erroneous").
There appears to be a split of authority in the First Circuit. Compare United States v.
Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1991) ("clearly erroneous/de novo") with United States
v. Lanni, 951 F.2d 440, 441 (1st Cir. 1991) ("clearly erroneous").
There also appears to be a split in the Seventh Circuit. Compare United States v Williams,
945 F.2d 192, 195-96 (7th Cir. 1991) ("clearly erroneous/de novo") with United States v.
Sewell, 942 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1991) ("clearly erroneous"), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1567
(1992), and United States v. Wilson, 938 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1991) ("clearly erroneous"),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 946 (1992). Yet one Seventh Circuit case has described its "clearly
erroneous" standard of review of suppression motion decisions as a "somewhat misleading
shorthand" for the concept that factual findings are subject to "clearly erroneous" review
while legal determinations are subject to "de novo" review. United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d
950, 953 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Eighth Circuit purports to use "clearly erroneous" review, but it also emphasizes
that the decision of the district court will be reversed if it is based on an "erroneous
interpretation of applicable law." United States v. Gibson, 928 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1991).
69. Compare United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding the
issue of whether a "seizure" has occurred to be a legal one subject to de novo review) with
United States v. Dunigan, 884 F.2d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that "seizure" is a
factual issue subject to "clearly erroneous" review).
70. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
71. Maragh, 894 F.2d at 418 (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 571 (1988)).
72. See supra note 69.
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to break "suppression motions" into factual and legal component
parts, exhibit a shockingly simplistic, unsophisticated view of standards of review that is light years behind the federal system.73
1. Motions to Suppress Involuntary Confessions
Consider, for example, Illinois' approach to reviewing a motion
that challenges the voluntariness of a confession. For decades, Illinois
courts have blithely held that "[f]indings by the circuit court on the
question of the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed by
a court of review unless they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence."'74 Not surprisingly, Illinois has totally ignored important
federal developments in this area.
Traditionally, the United State Supreme Court has reviewed the
voluntariness of confessions in state court cases on direct appeal under
a de novo standard. 71 In 1985, in Miller v. Fenton,76 the Court held
that when the issue of voluntariness of a confession in a state case
is presented in a federal habeas corpus petition, 77 the state court's
finding is not a fact presumed to be correct, 78 but is rather a legal
question meriting independent, de novo review. 79 Although Miller

73. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
74. People v. Smith, 561 N.E.2d 252, 263 (Ill.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990); accord, People
v. Scott, 594 N.E.2d 217, 229 (Il1. 1992); People v. Brownell, 404 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ill.), cert.
dismissed, 449 U.S. 811 (1980); People v. Stone, 256 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ill. 1970); People v.
Sims, 173 N.E.2d 494, 498 (111. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962); People v. Gavurnik,
117 N.E.2d 782, 784 (I1. 1954); People v. Scott, 81 N.E.2d 426, 428 (111. 1948); People v.
Albers, 195 N.E.2d 459, 462 (111.1935); People v. Everett, 593 N.E.2d 664, 669 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1992); People v. Anderson, 587 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (Il. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1992);
People v. Mendoza, 567 N.E.2d 23, 35 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist.), appeal denied, 575 N.E.2d
920 (Ill.
1991); People v. Urioste, 561 N.E.2d 471, 481 (Ill.
App, Ct. 5th Dist. 1990), appeal
denied, 567 N.E.2d 340 (Ill.
1991); see also cases cited supra note 60.
75. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252 (1991); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944).
76. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
77. 28 U.S.C. §2254.
78. See generally, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (providing that a federal court shall generally presume
facts found by a state court to be correct in a habeas corpus proceeding).
79. Miller v. Fenton holds that the issue of voluntariness of a confession "is a matter for
independent federal determination." 474 U.S. at 112. It could be contended that Miller
provides for a de novo determination by the federal district court, but that review of that
determination by the federal court of appeals need only be under the "clearly erroneous"
standard. See Keith R. Dolliver, Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas Proceedings: The
Proper Standardfor Appellate Review, 57 U.Chi. L. Rev. 141 (1990) (federal appellate courts
should treat federal district court findings of voluntariness of confessions in a §2254 petition
as a finding of fact under F.R.C.P. 52(a) and should then review it under a "clearly erroneous"
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concerned a §2254 state habeas corpus case, federal courts of appeal
have subsequently applied that holding to direct federal appeals as

well. Thus, in a federal criminal case, a federal district court's ruling
on a voluntariness of confession issue is reviewed de novo on direct
review by the federal court of appeals. 8° Lower federal courts have
focused on Miller's observation that "the voluntariness of a confession
has always had a uniquely legal dimension.''81
Despite this ferment in the area, the Illinois Supreme Court has
never discussed the possible effect of Miller v. Fenton on its standard
of review in voluntariness of confession cases. The only two Illinois
appellate court cases to discuss whether Miller v. Fenton supports a
change in the standard of review in this area both summarily rejected
the idea without any analysis.,'
2. Motions to Suppress Statements Based Upon Miranda
Violations

a. The Standard for Reviewing a Finding of "Custodial
Interrogation"
Miranda v. Arizona83 deals only with "the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation.

' 84

Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by

[a] law enforcement officer after a person has been taken into custody
standard); Sotelo v. Indiana State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244, 1253 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook,
1. concurring) (same). However, the federal courts of appeal are unanimous that Miller v.
Fenton requires de novo review of such an issue at both the federal district and federal court
of appeals levels. Sotelo v. Indiana State Prison, 850 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1988); Green v.
Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 900 (2d Cir. 1988); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 601 (3rd Cir. 1986).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Shaw, 894 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Raymer, 876
F.2d.383 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Crespo de Llano, 830 F.2d 1532, 1541 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wolf,
813 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hawkins, 823 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1072 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Fraction, 795
F.2d 12, 14 (3d Cir. 1986). But see Comment, supra note 79 (contending that Miller does not
mandate de novo standard on direct review of voluntariness of confession issue in a federal
criminal case); United States v. Arango, 853 F.2d 818, 824 (lth Cir. 1988) (using "clearly
erroneous" standard).
81. Miller, 474 U.S. at 116.
82. People v. Abernathy, 545 N.E.2d 201, 212 (Iil. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989); People v.
Fisher, 523 N.E.2d 1119 (II. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
83. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
84. Id. at 439.
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or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."

85

Perhaps the best reason why a finding of "custodial interrogation" should be considered a legal issue subject to de novo
review was expressed by former Judge Arlin Adams who wrote:
'Custodial interrogation' is a legal term of art central to Miranda
jurisprudence, and a decision whether or not 'custodial
interrogation' occurred is a matter of law to be determined in
accordance with the policies underlying the Miranda rule. The
legal nature of the determination is evidenced by the numerous
Supreme Court decisions deciding whether certain facts constitute
"custody" or "interrogation." (Cite omitted). Accordingly, an
appellate court is free to re-examine the trial court's legal conclusion
as to the applicability of the Miranda rule. The standard of
appellate review does not change simply because the legal
determination in a Miranda situation depends on the particular
facts of each case.86
Compare this thoughtful approach to that used by the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Brown.8 7 In deciding whether "custodial interrogation" occurred in that case, the supreme court noted
the various factors that need to be weighed and then stated:
As a result of this process, [Illinois appellate] courts have
understandably arrived at contradictory conclusions regarding the
effect of certain facts (citation omitted). However, when reviewing
the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, a court of review
should not disturb the court's finding unless it is manifestly
88
erroneous.
Consider the court's reasoning. From its apparent lament that
Illinois appellate courts have arrived at "contradictory conclu-

85. Id. at 444.
86. United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 591 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., concurring).
See also United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 717-18 (3rd Cir. 1988).
There appears to be a split of authority in the Seventh Circuit. Compare United States
v. Hocking, 860 F.2d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 1988) ("de novo") with United States v. Fazio, 914
F.2d 950, 955 (7th Cir. 1990) (questioning Hocking) and United States v. Levy, 955 F.2d 1098,
1103 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding Hocking "inconsistent with our existing case law" and
applying "clearly erroneous" standard).
The Ninth Circuit finds the question to be essentially factual and thus applies a "clearly
erroneous" standard. United States v. Poole, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986), amending 794
F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1986).
87. 554 N.E.2d 216 (Ill. 1990).
88. Id.
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sions," one might conclude that the court would consider adopting
' 89
a de novo standard in order to insure "consistent application
of the law. Yet, the court engages in no discussion of what should
be the appropriate standard of review; indeed, it does not even
characterize the issue as being legal, factual, or a mixed question.
Instead, it merely concludes without any analysis that "manifestly
erroneous" is the standard for reviewing a trial court's decision
concerning "custodial interrogation. "90
No case could better epitomize the Illinois approach to the
issue of standards of review. Indeed, it really is not even an "issue"
in the eyes of Illinois courts. More often than not, the standard
of review is determined by a tired citation, sans discussion or
analysis.
1) Is There "Custody"?
In determining whether there is "custody" pursuant to the
meaning of Miranda, the United States Supreme Court's numerous
opinions on the issue would suggest that it is a legal question. 9'
While several circuits have characterized this issue as either a
question of law or a mixed question of fact and law, 92 Illinois
courts have expressly characterized the issue as a question of fact
and have applied a manifestly erroneous standard of review. 93
2)

Is There "Interrogation"?

Any doubt that the issue of "interrogation" requires de novo
review would appear to have been resolved by the United States

89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
90. Brown, 554 N.E.2d at 220.
91. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 325 (1965).
92. See, e.g., Cobb v. Perini, 832 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1987) (expressly characterizing
the issue as legal); United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347-48 (8th Cir. 1990) (characterizing the issue as a mixed question of law and fact and applying a clearly erroneous
standard); United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1989) (characterizing
the issue as a mixed question of law and fact and applying de novo review); United States v.
Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 302 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (mixed law and fact and applying clearly erroneous
standard).
93. People v. Gorman, 565 N.E.2d 1349, 1355 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991); People v.
Lucy, 562 N.E.2d 1158, 1163-64 (I1. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990). See also, People v. Brown,
554 N.E.2d 216 (I1. 1990) (applying a manifestly erroneous standard without characterizing
the issue); People v. Foster, 552 N.E.2d 1112, 1125 (I1. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990) (characterizing
the issue as a question of fact); cf. United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir.
1989) (question of fact); United States v. Lanni, 951 F.2d 440, 443 (Ist Cir. 1991) ("clearly
erroneous" standard).
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Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Muniz. 94 Yet,
even as early as the Court's decision in Rhode Island v. Innis95 in
1980, the Court appeared to view "interrogaton" as a legal issue.
Nevertheless, in 1988 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the issue
of what constitutes interrogation under Miranda was to be reviewed
96
under a manifestly erroneous standard.
b. The Standard for Reviewing the Adequacy of Miranda
Warnings
The Ninth Circuit has held that whether a defendant has been
given adequate Miranda warnings is a question of law to be
reviewed de novo by an appellate court. 97 Judge Fletcher noted:
"De novo review is appropriate because the adequacy of Miranda
warnings involves application of a legal standard to a set of facts,
which 'require[s] the consideration of legal concepts and involves
the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal princi98
ples."'

Certainly, the United States Supreme Court's treatment of this
issue would indicate that it is essentially a legal, rather than factual,
question.99 Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court, with no analysis, has steadfastly treated this issue as a question of fact subject
to a "manifestly erroneous" review.'00

94. 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (deciding interrogation issue without apparently according deference
to lower court finding).
95. 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (deciding interrogation issue without apparently according deference
to lower court finding).
96. People v. Enoch, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1133 (111. 1988). Note that Justice Simon in dissent
contended it was a legal issue and that the majority had "abdicated its judicial responsibility"
by not resolving the issue. Id. at 1138.
97. United States v. Connell, 869 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1989); Territory of Guam v.
Snaer, 758 F.2d 1341, 1342 n.l (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 614 (9th
Cir. 1984). The Eighth Circuit agrees. United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 501 (8th Cir.
1992).
98. United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 206, 210 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) (Fletcher, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, (9th Cir.) (en banc), modifying 787 F.2d
1290 (9th Cir. 1985) and 764 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1985)).
99. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (deciding the adequacy of the warnings
issue without apparently according the lower court findings any deference); California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (same).
100. People v. Martin, 466 N.E.2d 228, 234 (I1. 1984); People v. Burbank, 291 N.E.2d
161, 164 (I1. 1972). One Illinois Appellate Court decision has treated. this issue as a question
of law subject to de novo review. People v. Williams, 464 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ill. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1984). The Williams court neither engaged in analysis nor acknowledged the line of
Illinois Supreme Court cases to the contrary.
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c. The Standard for Reviewing the Adequacy of a Waiver
of Miranda
There is a lively split among the federal circuits concerning the

proper standard for reviewing the adequacy of a Miranda waiver.
When the Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton'0 1 held that the

question of voluntariness of a confession used in a state court trial
is subject to de novo federal review, 02 it expressly left open the
question of whether a federal habeas court must extend a presumption of correctness to a state court's findings on the validity

of a defendant's Miranda waiver. 03 Several circuits have explicitly
faced this issue and have held that this is a factual determination
to which the habeas court owes deference. °4 Several circuits have
held that, even on direct review, the validity of a Miranda waiver
is a factual question to be reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. 10
Other circuits have held to the contrary. Both the District of

Columbia and the Fifth Circuits have ruled that the validity of a
Miranda waiver is a legal question which an appellate court should
review under a de novo standard.' ° 6
All of this has been lost on Illinois courts. They have continued
to invoke the "manifest error"

standard without the slightest

10 7
indication that any debatable issue exists.

101. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
102. Id. at 115.
103. Id. at 108 n.3.
104. Mikel v. Thieret, 887 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1989); Quadrini v. Clusen, 864 F.2d 577,
582 (7th Cir. 1989); Perri v. Director, 817 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 1987); Ahmad v. Redman,
782 F.2d 409, 412-13 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986). The Ninth Circuit holds
that the inquiry made by a federal court regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver made by
a state defendant has "two distinct dimensions." Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415-16 (9th
Cir. 1991). The waiver must have been made both "voluntar[ily]" and with "full awareness."
Collazo holds that the "voluntary" prong is reviewed de novo, while the "awareness" prong
is reviewed for "clear error," Id.
105. See United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ingram,
839 F.2d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Wauneka, 842 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Ricks, 817 F.2d 692, 697 (lth Cir. 1987); United States v. Doe, 819
F.2d 206, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ashby, 771 F.2d 392, 395 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1364 (1lth Cir. 1983); United States v. Dougherty, 810
F.2d 763, 773 (8th Cir. 1981).
106. United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Yunis,
859 F.2d 953, 957-8 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There
appears to be a split of authority in the Second Circuit. Compare United States v. Villegas,
928 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1991) ("de novo") with United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698,
701 (2d Cir. 1991) (district court's finding of waiver must be upheld if "any reasonable view
of the evidence supports it"; findings of fact binding unless "clearly erroneous").
107. See People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174, 187-88 (Ill. 1990); People v. Franklin, 545 N.E.2d
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Motions to Suppress Evidence

a.

Reviewing a Finding of Probable Cause

In a motion to quash an arrest or to suppress the fruits of a
search, the question is often whether or not "probable cause" was
established. 0 8
In the federal system, the United States Supreme Court in
Illinois v. Gates'0 9 clearly established that courts must give deference
to a magistrate's decision that probable cause exists and a warrant
should issue. Gates held that so long as the magistrate had a
"substantial basis" for his decision that probable cause existed, a
reviewing court should defer to that decision." 0 Gates specifically
held that "after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of
an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. "I Federal
courts thus use this deferential standard in determining whether a
warrant is supported by probable cause." 2

346, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989); People v. Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d 958, 966 (Ill. 1990);
People v. Woidtke, 587 N.E.2d 1101, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1992).
108. "Probable cause" is required before the police either obtain an arrest warrant or make
a warrantless arrest. "Probable cause" to arrest exists when "the facts and circumstances
within their knowledge and of which they [have] reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was
committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). "Probable cause" to search
exists when, under the "totality of circumstances," there is a "fair probability" that contraband
or evidence of a crime would be found. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
109. 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
110. Id. at 236.
11. Id.
112. At least one circuit has likened this degree of deference to the "clearly erroneous"
test. United States v. Huguez-Ibarra, 954 F.2d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 861
(9th Cir. 1986). However, Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook believe that "substantial
basis" review is more stringent than "clearly erroneous" review. Consequently, they have
advocated the adoption of the latter test in these circumstances. United States v. McKinney,
919 F.2d 405, 418-23 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring); United States v. Malin, 908
F.2d 163, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring, with Posner, J., joining), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 534 (1990).
There are numerous federal cases which use the Gates standard to review the probable
cause determination made in a search warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d
1059, 1068 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 930 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752, 754 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Elliott, 893 F.2d 220,
222 (9th Cir. 1990). Although Gates was concerned with search warrants, the same principle
has also been applied to arrest warrants. United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th
Cir. 1988); St. John v. Justman, 771 F.2d 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1985).
Note jhat the district court will be the first court to use the "substantial basis" test at
the motion to suppress when reviewing the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant. Several
circuits have held that the circuit court owes no particular deference to the district court's
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Yet federal circuits have closely divided on what standard of
review should be used to review the issue of probable cause when
no warrant was involved. Some circuits review probable cause in

this situation under a "clearly erroneous" standard of review." 3
Other circuits find "probable cause" to be essentially a legal
question. Therefore, they employ a de novo standard when consid'4
ering probable cause in a warrantless situation."

Again, contrast these approaches with Illinois. The Illinois
Supreme Court has adopted the Gates standard of review for
probable cause in warrant situations and has simply equated it with
its long-used "manifestly erroneous" standard." 5 Yet, the issue of
whether a more stringent standard should be used in a warrantless
situation-the issue that has created such a division in the federal
circuits-has never been alluded to in the Illinois Supreme Court.
It continues to use its boiler-plate "manifestly erroneous" standard
6
without an iota of analysis."
b.

Issues Arising in Cases with Warrants

1) The Standard for Reviewing Whether a Warrant has
Sufficient "Particularity"
The Fourth Amendment provides that a warrant must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."" 7 The purpose of this clause is to confine police

application of the test. In other words, whether a "substantial basis" existed is a question
that the circuit court may review de novo. United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Matter of
Trinity Indus., Inc. 898 F.2d 1049, 1050 (5th Cir. 1990).
113. United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Williams, 949 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d
1501, 1508 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1393 (8th Cir. 1987).
114. United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 744 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dunn,
935 F.2d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir.

19.90).
The Seventh Circuit "has verbalized conflicting standards of review" on this issue. See
United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases).
115. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 158 (I1. 1984).
116. People v. Williams, 588 N.E.2d 983, 995 (Ill.
1991); People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d
1360, 1368 (I1. 1988); People v. Foster, 518 N.E.2d 82, 87 (Ill.
1987); People v. Cabrera, 508
N.E.2d 708, 712 (Il1. 1987). See also People v. Hunley, 545 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1989).
117. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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activity in order to prevent general searches." ' There is federal
authority that this is a legal issue requiring de novo review."19
Illinois courts, however, appear to have dealt with this issue without
20
articulating any standard of review.
2) The Standard for Reviewing a Trial Judge's Decision
to Deny a Franks Hearing
In Franks v. Delaware,'2 ' the Supreme Court held that in
certain limited situations a defendant may obtain a hearing in order
to challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit. To obtain such a
hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing" that the affiant has intentionally or recklessly included a false,
22
material statement in the affidavit.
Several federal circuits hold that the standard of review when
reviewing a trial court's denial of a Franks hearing is a deferential,
"clearly erroneous" one. 23 Yet, at least one circuit has held that
this is an essentially legal decision meriting de novo review. 24 The
Illinois Supreme Court, in upholding a trial court's denial of a
12 5
Franks hearing, does not even articulate a standard of review.
3) The Standard for Reviewing a Trial Judge's Ruling
on the "Good Faith Exception"
In United States v. Leon, 26 the Supreme Court held that even
if an affidavit on which a warrant was based was insufficient to

118. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
119. United States v. Schmidt, 947 F.2d 362, 371 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gahagan,
865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 285 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
120. People v. Rixie, 546 N.E.2d 52, 58-59 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989); People v. Allbritton,
502 N.E.2d 83, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986); People v. Raicevich, 377 N.E.2d 1266, 1270
(Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1978); People v. Mitchell, 377 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1978).
121. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
122. Id. at 155-56, 171-72.
123. United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1226-27 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rumney,
867 F.2d 714, 720 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Cancela, 812 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.
1987); United States v. Mastroianni,749 F.2d 900, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1984).
124. United States v. Tedford, 875 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Whitworth,
856 F.2d 1268, 1280 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir.
1988).
125. People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268, 282 (11. 1989) (holding only that the trial court's
denial of a Franks hearing was "not erroneous").
126. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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establish probable cause, evidence seized pursuant to the warrant
could nevertheless be introduced in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
This could occur if the evidence was obtained by law enforcement
officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant
that had been issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.

27

Federal circuit courts have faced the issue of the appropriate
standard of review in examining a district court's decision as to
whether or not an officer acted in objective good faith. The Fifth
Circuit analogized the question to one of "good faith" qualified
immunity from civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.128 In that area, the Supreme Court held the issue to be an

"essentially legal question."'' 29 So, too, the Fifth Circuit found the
"good faith" issue in Leon to be a legal question meriting de novo
review. 30 Other circuits facing the issue have also opted for de
novo review.' 3' Illinois courts do not appear to have articulated a
32
standard of review on this question.
c. Issues Arising in Cases Without Warrants
1) The Standard for Reviewing Whether "Exigent
Circumstances" Will Excuse a Warrant
As a general rule, probable cause alone will not justify a search
or seizure; there must also be a warrant.' One exception to the
warrant requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances are factors which "militate against delay and

127. Id. at 924-26.
128. United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1985).
129. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
130. Maggitt, 778 F.2d at 1034-35. See also United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 905
(5th Cir. 1992).
131. United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 930 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. CorralCorral, 899 F.2d 927, 928 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 606 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fama,
758 F.2d 834, 837 (2d. Cir. 1985); United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sager,
743 F.2d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir. 1984).
132. People v. Bohan, 511 N.E.2d 1384 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987); People v. Rehkopf,
506 N.E.2d 435 (I11.App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987); People v. Stewart, 473 N.E.2d 1227 (I11. 1984).
133. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stating that "the police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of search and seizures through the warrant
procedure, . . . [and] in most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can
only be excused by exigent circumstances." Id. at 20.
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justif[y] the officer's decision to proceed without a warrant.' 13 4
Courts have, from time to time, established factors which justify
acting without a warrant."'
The majority of federal circuits that have squarely addressed
the question find the proper standard of review to be de novo
because of the legal analysis required. 3 6 Although there is conflict

in the cases, a 1981 Illinois Supreme Court case that has never
been overruled holds that the issue is reviewed under a "manifestly
37
erroneous" standard.
4.

Seizures

One of the most litigated issues at criminal trials concerns the
constitutionality of seizures. If a defendant has been improperly
seized, then the evidence recovered pursuant to that seizure must

be suppressed. 3 ' Consequently, it is crucial to determine the proper
standard of review for a seizure issue. Again, while the federal

courts have recently conducted a lively debate on these issues,
Illinois courts show no awareness of these issues.
a.

Did a "Seizure" Occur?

Not every contact between a police officer and a citizen constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. As the United
States Supreme Court recently stated:

134. People v. White, 512 N.E.2d 677, 685 (III. 1987) citing People v. Abney, 407 N.E.2d
543 (111. 1980).
135. For a representative list, see, e.g., People v. Spicer, 516 N.E.2d 491, 496-97 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
136. The circuits using the de novo standard include the Sixth Circuit (United States v.
Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Sangineto-Niranda, 859
F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir. 1988)); Ninth Circuit (United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959,
962 (9th Cir. 1988) and United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1987));
and Tenth Circuit (United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1989) and United
States v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1986)).
Those circuits choosing "clearly erroneous" review include the Second Circuit (United
States v. Atherton, 936 F.2d 728, 732 (2d Cir. 1991) and United States v. MacDonald, 916
F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc)) and Fifth Circuit (United States v. Vasquez, 953 F.2d
176, 179 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The First Circuit reviews a lower court's finding of exigency to determine whether it is
"proper." United States v. Beltran, 917 F.2d 641, 642 (1st Cir. 1990).
137. People v. Holloway, 426 N.E.2d 871, 877 (Ill. 1981). See also People v. Chambers,
558 N.E.2d 274, 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990). But see, People v. Foskey, 554 N.E.2d
192, 197 (I1. 1990) (stating in dictum that the issue should be reviewed de novo if neither the
facts nor credibility of the witnesses is questioned); People v. Abney, 407 N.E.2d 543, 547
(II1. 1980).
138. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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[11n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes
a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding
the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the

encounter.,3 9

In making this determination, courts have considered a variety of
factors. 140
Federal courts have engaged in sophisticated analyses of the
proper standard of review on this issue. Some courts have emphasized the essentially fact-bound nature of the decision and thus

have supported a "clearly erroneous" standard; others have stressed
that the objective nature of the inquiry involves more of a legal
141
judgment that requires de novo review to ensure consistency.
Illinois courts have taken no part in this national legal debate.

Without any analysis, they simply continue to use the "manifestly
42
erroneous" standard.1

b. If a "Seizure" Occurred, Was it Lawful?
If there is no "seizure," then the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated. If, however, a court characterizes police activity as a
139. Florida v. Bostick, Il1 S.Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991).
140. One court identified some of the relevant factors as "the threatening presence of several
officers; the display of a weapon; physical touching of the person by the officer; language or
tone indicating that compliance with the officer was compulsory; prolonged retention of a
person's personal effects, such as airplane tickets or identification; and a request by the officer
to accompany him to the police station or a police room." United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d
484, 491 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir. 1990)).
141. Three circuits will uphold a district court's decision unless it is clearly erroneous:
Fourth Circuit (United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1991)); Fifth Circuit
(United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991)); Sixth Circuit
(United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
Three circuits use a de novo standard of review: District of Columbia Circuit (United
States v. Jordan, 951 F.2d 1278, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Second Circuit (United States v.
Springer, 946 F.2d 1012, 1015 (2d Cir. 1991)); Eighth Circuit (United States v. McKines, 933
F.2d 1412, 1424-26 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
The Ninth Circuit appears split. Compare Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 826 (9th
Cir. 1987) (de novo) with United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1986) ("clearly
erroneous").
For cogent arguments on this close issue, compare United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d
415, 417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (de novo) and United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 142426 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (de novo) with United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., dissenting) ("clearly erroneous") and United States v. McKines, 933
F.2d 1412, 1419-22 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Beam, J., dissenting) ("clearly erroneous").
142. People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316, 332 (I11. 1990); People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309,
311 (111. 1990); People v. Salome, 559 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (111.App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990).

HeinOnline -- 17 S. Ill. U. L. J. 74 1992-1993

19921

Reform of Illinois Criminal Standards of Review

"seizure," the next question is whether the seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. There are two questions: 1) is there
a seizure? and 2) if so, is it reasonable? Because these are two
separate questions, a court may utilize two different standards of
review. For example, in United States v. Wilson the Fourth Circuit
used a "clearly erroneous" standard of review in considering the
district court's finding that a seizure had occurred. 43 Yet, once it
affirmed the district court's finding that a seizure had occurred, it
used a de novo standard in determining whether the seizure was
legal. 44 As Judge Abner Mikva of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia expressed it, "The factual
question of whether a seizure has occurred should not be confused
with the legal conclusion of whether the seizure was lawful."' 4
Several courts have recognized the propriety of applying a de novo
standard of review to the issue of legality of a seizure. '6
Illinois courts do not appear to recognize a distinction between
these two very different questions. These courts paint all issues
arising out of a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing with a
"manifestly erroneous" brush. 47
c. The Standard for Reviewing a Warrantless Seizure Under
the "Plain View" Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine allows the police to make a warrantless seizure of an object if the police are lawfully in the place
where the item is located and if the object's incriminating character
is "immediately apparent.' ' 4 The Supreme Court has not explicitly
adopted a standard of review on this issue. However, in Horton
v. California49 the court stressed the "objective standards of
conduct"' 50 necessary in analyzing this issue, which might suggest
the need for uniformity through de novo review. At least one
circuit has held that de novo is the proper standard of review.''

143. 953 F.2d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1991).
144. Id. at 124.
145. Maragh, 894 F.2d at 420 (Mikva, J.,dissenting).
146. In addition to United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 124 (4th Cir. 1991), see United
States v. Mines, 883 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089,
1092 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1992).
147. See cases cited supra note 142.
148. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Illinois, with no discussion, uses the "manifestly erroneous" stan52
dard.
B.

The Standard for Reviewing a Claim of Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel
Here, the United States Supreme Court has been quite clear

in characterizing this question as a mixed question of law and
fact."' Consequently, there is ample federal authority for reviewing
this issue de novo. 54 However, at least one Illinois court, with no
discussion, has used a "manifestly erroneous" standard. 55
C. The Standard for Reviewing the Waiver of the Right to
Counsel
The United States Supreme Court appears to view the issue of
waiver of counsel as a mixed question of law and fact. The Court

in Brewer v. Williams'56 characterized the issue of the waiver of
counsel as "not a question of historical fact, but one which, in
the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, requires 'application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. . . ." " Conse8
quently, there are federal courts that review the issue de novo.1

However, Illinois courts merely determine whether the manifest
weight of the evidence supports the trial court's determination. 5 9
D.

The Standard of Review for Determining Whether a Defense

Attorney Labored Under a Conflict of Interest
The United States Supreme Court has held that the ultimate
issue of whether a defense lawyer engaged in multiple representation
152. People v. Wilson, 506 N.E.2d 571 (I11.
1987).
153. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697-98 (1984).
154. Fields v. Attorney Gen. of Md., 956 F.2d 1290, 1297 n.18 (4th Cir. 1992); Reese v.
Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Elias, 937 F.2d 1514, 1520
(10th Cir. 1991); Crowe v. Sowders, 864 F.2d 430, 433 (6th Cir. 1989); Fitzpatrick v.
McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.1989); Nixon v. Newsome, 888 F.2d 112, 115 (11th
Cir. 1989).
155. People v. Brandon, 510 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (111.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
156. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
157. Id. at 403.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 1991); see also
Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1986).
159. E.g., People v. Smith, 414 N.E.2d 1281, 1289-90 (II1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1980) (applying
manifest weight standard to question of whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his sixth amendment right to counsel); People v. Beamer, 376 N.E.2d 368, 371 (I11.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1978) (holding that the trial court's finding that the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his fifth amendment right to counsel was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence).
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constituting a conflict of interest is a mixed question of law and
fact. 60 There is federal authority for application of a de novo
standard of review.' 6' Illinois courts do not seem to have articulated
62
a standard of review for this issue.
The preceding list is by no means exhaustive. 63 And again,
the point is not that Illinois is necessarily wrong on every issue.
The problem is that Illinois courts refuse to acknowledge the
conflicts involving standards of review in criminal cases. Moreover,
by refusing to acknowledge the conflicts, they also avoid providing
principled reasons for the positions they hold. Illinois courts have
for years abdicated their responsibility in this key area of the law.
IV. TWO WAYS TO AVOID APPLICATION OF ILLINOIS'
"MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS" STANDARD OF REVIEW ON
SUPPRESSION MOTION DECISIONS
As illustrated above, a party challenging a trial court's ruling
on a suppression motion faces a difficult task on appeal. Illinois
severely limits the review of all aspects of a suppression decision;
an appellate court must accept all parts of the ruling below unless
there is "manifest error."

160. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342 (1980).
161. There is dispute among the current members of the United States Supreme Court as
to whether the Court has determined that de novo review is appropriate for deciding the issue
in the context of a federal habeas corpus petition from a state court conviction. See Wright
v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482 (1992).
At least two federal circuits use de novo review for the ultimate legal determination: the
Tenth Circuit (United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 480 (10th Cir. 1990)) and
the Third Circuit (United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1071 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988)).
162. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 563 N.E.2d 431 (111. 1990); People v. Ruiz, 547 N.E.2d
170 (Ill. 1989); People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 1988).
163. Other examples of Illinois being at odds with federal courts on a standard of review
include whether evidence is sufficiently attenuated from an illegal search or seizure to be
considered "untainted" (compare United States v. Johns, 891 F.2d 243, 244 (9th Cir. 1989)
(mixed question; de novo) with People v. Lekas, 508 N.E.2d 221, 238 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1987)); the propriety of a Terry stop (compare United States v. Webb, 950 F.2d 226, 229 (5th
Cir. 1991) (de novo) and United States v. Franco-Munoz, 952 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1991)
(de novo) with People v. Galvin, 535 N.E.2d 837, 843 (11. 1989) (manifestly erroneous );
sufficiency of the indictment (compare United States v. Shelton, 937 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir.
1991) (de novo) and Frank v. United States, 914 F.2d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 1990) (de novo) with
People v. Thingvold, 584 N.E.2d 89, 91 (111. 1991) (standard applied depends on when the
defendant first challenges the indictment or information)).
Illinois advocates should carefully read Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Wright,
112 S.Ct at 2493. Her opinion catalogs numerous habeas corpus decisions of the United States
Supreme Court dealing with a variety of issues all of which, she avers, used a de novo standard
of review. Her opinion would support an argument that a particular issue is a mixed question
of law and fact which Illinois should choose to review with a de novo standard.
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Yet there is hope for an appellant. There are two ways a party
appealing an adverse decision on a suppression motion can obtain
a more favorable de novo standard of review.
A. If the Party Challenging a Lower Court's Decision on a
Suppression Motion Does Not Challenge Either the Credibility or
the Testimony of the Prevailing Party's Witnesses, the Lower
Court's Decision is Subject to De Novo Review
There is authority in Illinois that an appellate court will review
a lower court's suppression motion decision de novo if the substance
of the testimony itself is not challenged. For example, in In re
D. G.1 4 the appellant challenged the trial court's finding that probable cause supported his arrest. Although conceding that usually
the standard of review for a suppression motion is "manifestly
erroneous," the Illinois Supreme Court found this case to be
different because "where neither the facts nor credibility of the
witnesses is contested, the issue of whether probable cause exists
is a legal question which a reviewing court may consider de novo."' 6
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled similarly in at least two other
cases.166 The Appellate Court has likewise recognized this excep,67
tion.
Two points merit discussion. The first is why so few cases use
the exception. It would not seem rare for a party challenging a
suppression decision to be willing to argue that, even if the facts
were viewed in the least favorable light, the court below simply
made a legal error. The paucity of such cases might reflect the
general lack of interest Illinois courts (and perhaps lawyers) seem
to have in standards of review in criminal cases.

164. 581 N.E.2d 648 (111.1991).

165. Id. at 649.
166. People v. Foskey, 554 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ill.
1990) (exigent circumstances); People v.
Abney, 407 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Il. 1980) (exigent circumstances).
167. People v. Galdine, 571 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991) (warrantless
search); People v. Froio, 555 N.E.2d 770, 773 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990) (Terry stop);
People v. Graves, 553 N.E. 2d 810, 812 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990) (seizure).

There is some ambiguity both in these cases and in those cited in notes 155-56, supra,
concerning which party is not "contesting" the facts and credibility of the witnesses. One
court has specifically applied the exception when it was the defendant who did not challenge
any of the testimony. People v. Ocon, 581 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991). There are
cases, however, that have applied the de novo standard after finding that the trialcourt found
the facts were undisputed. People v. Clark, 494 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Il1. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986);
People v. Sain, 461 N.E.2d 1043, 1046-(Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1984).
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Second, it might be asked why Illinois has chosen to carve out
this small "de novo" exception in this particular category of cases.
Illinois, as discussed earlier, generally uses a "manifestly erroneous" standard on all issues, both factual and legal, involved at a
suppression hearing. 168 It this gives trial courts a substantial amount
of leeway in their decisions. The choice to exercise de novo review
is a choice to bring more uniformity to an area of law. 69 It is
difficult to understand why this one particular category of suppression cases-those in which neither the facts nor credibility of
the witnesses is contested-should be a better candidate for de
novo review than any other category. There is no guarantee, of
course, that a case with no factual dispute will contain a legal issue
which requires any large-scale uniformity. Moreover, an appellate
court always has the power to eliminate any factual dispute in a
case. It could, for example, simply review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below 70 and then decide the
legal issue de novo. Or it could adopt the "clearly erroneous/de
novo" standard used by several federal circuits-that is, review
factual findings made at a suppression hearing under a clearly
erroneous standard and review all legal issues under a de novo
standard.' 7 '
The exception lacks a principled rationale. Nevertheless, it is
"good law" in Illinois. A party challenging the propriety of a
suppression court's ruling should seriously consider explicitly telling
the appellate court that it is challenging neither the facts nor the
credibility of the witnesses at the hearing; thus, pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court authority, the appellate court should exercise de
novo review.
B. De Novo Review May Be Proper when the Trial Court
Decides a Suppression Motion Without Properly Stating its
Findings of Fact and Law
There is a second possible way to obtain de novo review of
the decision of a suppression motion. The Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that an order granting or denying a suppression

168. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
170. Compare the standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims in Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
171. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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motion should state the findings of fact and conclusions of law
upon which the order is based.'"7

A problem arises when an

appellate court is faced with a decision without these required
findings.
There is a line of authority in Illinois which holds that in such
a situation testimony supporting the trial court's decision should
be accepted unless clearly unreasonable. However, the appellate
court owes no deference to the trial court's legal determinations
and can review those findings de novo. Several Illinois Supreme
Court cases support this rule.17

Thus, a second strategy for obtaining de novo review is for
the appellant to contend that the trial court has not complied with
Section 114-12(e) of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
V.

TWO STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE

A. Convincing Illinois Courts to Recognize "Mixed Questions
of Law and Fact"
If Illinois appellate courts are ever going to adopt better
calibrated, more sophisticated standards of review in criminal cases,
they will need Illinois criminal appellate lawyers to begin raising
better standard of review issues. Perhaps the single most important
task for appellate lawyers is to urge Illinois courts to begin to
recognize that "grey area" between legal and factual issues, the
"mixed question of law and fact."
The standard of review for "mixed question of law and fact"
is one of the most hotly contested issues now being argued in
federal courts. As noted in the Introduction, during this past term
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wright v.
West' 74 to decide the proper standard of review for mixed questions
presented in a federal habeas petition from a state court judgment.
172. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 114-12(e)(1991).
173. People v. Clark, 440 N.E.2d 869, 871 (11. 1982); People v. DeMorrow, 320 N.E.2d 1,
5-6 (111. 1974); People v. Haskell, 241 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ill. 1968), overruled on other grounds,
People v. Nunn, 304 N.E. 2d 81 (Ill. 1973).
This line of authority appears distinguishable from another set of cases in which the trial
court's factual findings were criticized for not being "more specific." People v. Brown, 554
N.E.2d 216, 220 (111. 1990); People v. Winters, 454 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. 1983). In these cases, the
Supreme Court either found that the evidence supported the trial court's decision (see Brown,
554 N.E.2d at 220) or presumed that the trial court credited only the testimony that supported
its ruling (see Winters, 454 N.E.2d at 303).
174. 112 S.Ct 2482 (1992).
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Although the Supreme Court decided the case without reaching
that issue, dictum throughout the Court's several opinions showed
that the justices were badly split on the question. 7 A recent law
review article discussing what should be the proper standard of
review for mixed questions stated that this issue has created a
'7 6
"troublesome and divisive conflict among the federal circuits.'

A LEXIS search of recent federal cases shows how frequently
the "mixed question" concept arises. According to LEXIS, during
a recent eighteen month period the phrases "mixed question of law
and fact" and "mixed question of fact and law" can be found in
588 federal cases. 177 During that same period those phrases appear
in only four Illinois cases.

78

In fact, a search of the entire Illinois

case law database revealed that those phrases have been used in
only 174 Illinois cases, both civil and criminal.7 9
It is astonishing how seldom Illinois courts ever refer to a

"mixed question." Illinois cases can be found referring to issues
such as the following as "mixed questions": probable cause to

arrest; 80 probable cause to search;' and jury impartiality." 2 But
even on those rare occasions when an issue is characterized as a
"mixed question," the decisions rarely recognize that this might
have an impact in the area of standard of review." 3

175. Chief Justice Rehniquist, Justice Thomas, and Justice Scalia contended that the court
had never squarely decided whether mixed questions in a state habeas corpus case should be
reviewed de novo. Wright, 112 S.Ct at 2489 n.6 (Thomas, J., announcing judgment of the
court) (decided June 19, 1992). On the other hand, Justices O'Connor, Blackmun, and Stevens
said the court had long ago held that de novo was the proper standard of review. Id. at 2493
(O'Connor, J.,concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy agreed with O'Connor, Blackmun,
and Stevens. Id. at 2498 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Souter and White
did not reach the issue even in dictum. See Id. at 2493 (White, J., concurring in the judgment);
Id. at 2500 (Souter, J.,concurring in the judgment).
176. Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making And The Proper Role Of Federal Appellate
Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S.CAL. L.Rlv. 235, 235 (1991).
177. LEXIS search conducted July 2, 1992, under "GENFED" and "CURRNT."
178. LEXIS search conducted July 2, 1992, for Illinois cases decided after 1990.
179. LEXIS search conducted July 2, 1992.
180. See, e.g., In re D.G., 581 N.E.2d at 649; People v. Lee, 502 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986); People V. Strauser, 496 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (111.App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1986); People v. Eyler, 477 N.E.2d 774, 779 (11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985); People v. Loftus,
444 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1983); People v. Lippert, 432 N.E.2d 605, 607
(Ill.
1982); People v. Exum, 47 N.E.2d 56, 60 (Ill.
1943); People v. Duchant, 19 N.E.2d 590,
592 (I1. 1939).
181. People v. McClanahan, 547 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989).
182. People v. Taylor, 462 N.E.2d 478, 484 (Ill.
1984).
183. See, e.g., In re D.G., 581 N.E.2d at 649 (finding probable cause to arrest to be a
mixed question but, in dictum and with no analysis, accepting "manifestly erroneous" as the
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Recognizing the concept of the "mixed question of law and
fact" would constitute an important step for the review of criminal
cases in Illinois appellate courts. Because it is so frequently used
in other jurisdictions,'18 it is imperative that Illinois courts also
utilize it.
B.

Revision of Supreme Court Rule 341

The blame for the sorry state of standards of review in Illinois
criminal cases does not rest solely with the judiciary. Appellate
lawyers must also accept part of the responsibility. Advocates on
both sides must raise and develop standard of review issues to aid
courts in their decisions.
Merely encouraging advocates to raise standard of review issues
is not enough. Instead, it should be mandatory that every issue in
every brief must include the proper standard of review. Language
similar to the following from the Ninth Circuit's rules' 8 should be
added to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 :186 "[Wlith respect to
each contention raised on appeal, each party shall identify the
proper standard of review on appeal at the outset of the discussion
of that contention. (E.g., "abuse of discretion," "clearly erroneous," "substantial evidence in the record as a whole," "de novo
review.")."
In those cases where the standard of review is not clear, this
point should be raised and discussed by both sides. In this way,
Illinois would develop a dialogue on standards of review.
Of course, discussions in the parties' briefs would be futile if
they were ignored by the appellate court. Thus, all appellate courts
in Illinois should agree to begin each issue in each case with a
discussion of the appropriate standard of review. Again, the Ninth
Circuit proves an appropriate model. In every published opinion,

usual standard of review); People v. Strauser, 496 N.E.2d at 1133-34 (applying "manifestly
erroneous" standard of review to "mixed question of law and fact" of probable cause to
arrest using no special analysis). But see People v. Taylor, 462 N.E.2d 478, 484 (Ill. 1984)
(relying on United States Supreme Court authority to hold that mixed question of "jury
impartiality" was subject to independent evaluation by an appellate court).
184. For a useful list, see Justice O'Connor's recent concurring opinion in Wright, 112
S.Ct. at 2493 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185. Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Rule 13(b)(2)A.
186. The new language should become the second and third sentences of Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 341(e)(7). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. i1OA,
341(e)(7)(1991). It will also apply to briefs
filed by appellees and other parties by operation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(f). ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, I 341(f)(1991).
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the standard of review for each issue is precisely set out.1 7
Thus, by both requiring advocates to raise standard of review
issues and courts to decide such issues, Illinois criminal appellate
decisions will be greatly improved.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Illinois advocates and judges have for too long ignored the
area of standards of review in criminal appellate decisions. It is
time not only to distinguish factual questions from legal questions,
but also to recognize that numerous issues are "mixed questions
of law and fact" requiring separate, special consideration. It is
time for both Illinois appellate courts and Illinois appellate advocates to begin this task.

187. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th
Cir. 1992) (see section entitled "Standard of Review").
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